How Do Employers Use Compensation History? Evidence from a Field Experiment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Barach, Moshe A.; Horton, John J.
• 署名单位: University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/709277
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 193-218
• 关键词: job; PRODUCTIVITY; workers

摘要

We report the results of a field experiment in which treated employers could not observe the compensation history of their job applicants. Treated employers responded by evaluating more applicants and evaluating those applicants more intensively. They also responded by changing what kind of workers they evaluated: treated employers evaluated workers with 5% lower past average wages and hired workers with 13% lower past average wages. Conditional on bargaining, workers hired by treated employers struck better wage bargains for themselves.