Judge Effects, Case Characteristics, and Plea Bargaining

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Butcher, Kristin F.; Park, Kyung H.; Piehl, Anne Morrison
• 署名单位: Wellesley College; National Bureau of Economic Research; Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/712981
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: S543-S574
• 关键词: Sentencing guidelines; judicial discretion; DISCRIMINATION; incarceration; disparities; EMPLOYMENT

摘要

A growing literature uses random assignment of cases to judges to examine criminal sentencing. To extend this line of work, we directly examine how judicial harshness varies with the seriousness of criminal conviction. Using a model that respects the mix of cases and the noise produced by small caseloads, we find that case severity is best viewed as an endogenous outcome of bargaining. We also find that harsher judges have a higher share of cases failing to reach a plea bargain, but perhaps surprisingly, there is little evidence that large jumps in expected incarceration lead to differential plea bargain outcomes.