Workplace Incentives and Organizational Learning

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Amodio, Francesco; Martinez-Carrasco, Miguel A. A.
• 署名单位: McGill University; Universidad de los Andes - Chile
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/719686
• 发表日期: 2023
• 关键词: productivity spillovers; management-practices; field experiment; technical change; TECHNOLOGY; FIRMS; pay; provision; DYNAMICS; MARKETS

摘要

This paper studies learning among coworkers when incentives change. We use a simple principal-agent model to show that when workers are not fully informed on the global shape of the production function, (1) their effort choice changes over time as information is disclosed and processed and (2) changing incentives can trigger this learning process. We test this prediction using personnel data from an egg production plant in Peru. Exploiting a sudden change in the contract parameters, we find that workers learn from each other over the shape of the production function. This adjustment process is costly for the firm.