Government as borrower of first resort

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chemla, Gilles; Hennessy, Christopher A.
• 署名单位: Imperial College London; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); University of London; London Business School
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2016.09.001
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 1-16
• 关键词: Safe assets; Risky corporate debt; INFORMATION; INVESTMENT; government debt

摘要

Optimal government bond supply is examined under asymmetric information and safe asset scarcity. Corporations issue junk debt when demand for safe debt is high since uninformed investors then migrate to risky overheated debt markets. Uninformed demand stimulates informed speculation, driving debt prices toward fundamentals, encouraging pooling at high leverage. As borrower of first resort, government can issue bonds, siphoning off uninformed demand for risky corporate debt, reducing wasteful informed speculation. Government bonds eliminate pooling at high leverage or improve risk sharing in such equilibria. Optimal government bond supply is increasing in demand for safe assets and non-monotonic in marginal Q. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.