Optimal reputation building in the New Keynesian model

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lu, Yang K.; King, Robert G.; Pasten, Ernesto
• 署名单位: Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; Boston University; Central Bank of Chile; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2016.10.010
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 233-249
• 关键词: Imperfect credibility; optimal monetary policy; time inconsistency

摘要

We study the optimal committed monetary policy when the private sector has imperfect information and has to infer the central banker's ability to commit. The optimal policy is designed to influence learning and improve the central banker's reputation of being committed. The reputation building implies that when a committed central banker first takes office, he should resist the temptation to stimulate output with initially high but declining inflation; he should reverse a missed inflation target rather than accommodate it; and he should adopt a less accommodative inflation response to a cost-push shock than a full commitment solution suggests. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.