Unions in a frictional labor market

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Krusell, Per; Rudanko, Leena
• 署名单位: Stockholm University; University of Gothenburg; National Bureau of Economic Research; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Philadelphia
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2016.04.006
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 35-50
• 关键词: Labor unions; frictional labor markets; time inconsistency; limited commitment; Long-term wage contracts

摘要

A labor market with search and matching frictions, where wage setting is controlled by a monopoly union that follows a norm of wage solidarity, is found vulnerable to substantial distortions associated with holdup. With full commitment to future wages, the union achieves efficient hiring in the long run, but hikes up wages in the short run to appropriate rents from firms. Without commitment, in a Markov-perfect equilibrium, hiring is too low both in the short and the long run. The quantitative impact is demonstrated in an extended model with partial union coverage and multiperiod union contracting. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.