Multirater Performance Evaluations and Incentives

• 成果类型: Article; Early Access
• 署名作者: Ockenfels, Axel; Sliwka, Dirk; Werner, Peter
• 署名单位: University of Cologne; Max Planck Society; IZA Institute Labor Economics; University of Cologne; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Maastricht University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/730321
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: calibration committees; BIAS; RECIPROCITY; DISCRETION; IMPACT

摘要

We compare evaluations of employee performance by individuals and groups of supervisors, analyzing a formal model and running a laboratory experiment. The model predicts that multirater evaluations are more precise than single-rater evaluations if groups rationally aggregate their signals about employee performance. Our controlled laboratory experiment confirms this prediction and finds evidence that this can indeed be attributed to accurate information processing in the group. Moreover, when employee compensation depends on evaluations, multirater evaluations tend to be associated with higher performance.