Promotions, Adverse Selection, and Efficiency

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Waldman, Michael; Yin, Zhenda
• 署名单位: Cornell University; Shanghai Jiao Tong University; Peking University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0734-306X
• DOI: 10.1086/726065
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 121-159
• 关键词: Asymmetric information; career concerns; labor-markets; firm; tournaments; uncertainty; CONTRACTS

摘要

We consider how adverse selection affects the efficiency of turnover and postturnover job assignments. In the model, when a high-ability worker is not promoted at the worker's current employer because of a lack of available managerial openings, it is efficient for the worker to move to a firm seeking a high-ability worker to promote. But this type of turnover does not occur given asymmetric information and adverse selection. We show that up-or-out contracts can be an efficient response to this inefficiency, where our analysis matches several observations concerning real-world promotion decisions and practices related to up-or-out.