Public debt in economies with heterogeneous agents

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Bhandari, Anmol; Evans, David; Golosov, Mikhail; Sargent, Thomas J.
• 署名单位: University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University of Oregon; University of Chicago; New York University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2017.09.007
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 39-51
• 关键词: Distorting tax; transfers; government debt; ricardian equivalence

摘要

We study public debt in competitive equilibria in which a government chooses transfers and taxes optimally and in addition decides how thoroughly to enforce debt contracts. If the government enforces perfectly, asset inequality is determined in an optimum competitive equilibrium but the level of government debt is not. Welfare increases if private debt contracts are not enforced. Borrowing frictions let the government gather monopoly rents that come from issuing public debt without facing competing private borrowers. Regardless of whether the government chooses to enforce private debt contracts, the level of initial government debt does not affect an optimal allocation. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.