Conservatism and liquidity traps

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Nakata, Taisuke; Schmidt, Sebastian
• 署名单位: Federal Reserve System - USA; European Central Bank
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2018.09.005
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 37-47
• 关键词: Deflationary bias; Inflation conservatism; inflation targeting; liquidity traps; zero lower bound

摘要

In an economy with an occasionally binding zero lower bound (ZLB) constraint, the anticipation of future ZLB episodes creates a trade-off for discretionary central banks between inflation and output stabilization. As a consequence, inflation systematically falls below target even when the policy rate is above zero. Appointing Rogoffs (1985) conservative central banker mitigates this deflationary bias away from the ZLB and enhances welfare by improving allocations both at and away from the ZLB. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.