Forward guidance: Communication, commitment, or both?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bassetto, Marco
• 署名单位: Federal Reserve System - USA
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2019.08.015
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 69-86
• 关键词: Cheap talk; credibility; Odyssean; Delphic; Central bank

摘要

Forward guidance has been suggested as a form of commitment (Odyssean) by the policymaker or as a way of conveying information (Delphic). I analyze the interaction between households and the central bank as a game in which the central bank sends messages. Without private information, the set of equilibrium payoffs is independent of any announcements: Pure Odyssean forward guidance is redundant. With private information, communication can have social value. Forward guidance is well suited to leverage preexisting credibility to communicate a central bank's private information about its own preferences or beliefs. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.