Can currency competition work?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fernandez-Villaverde, Jesus; Sanches, Daniel
• 署名单位: National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Pennsylvania; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Philadelphia
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2019.07.003
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 1-15
• 关键词: Private money; Currency competition; Cryptocurrencies

摘要

Can competition among privately-issued fiat currencies work? Only sometimes and partially. To show this, we build a model of competition among privately-issued fiat currencies. A purely private arrangement fails to implement an efficient allocation, even though it can deliver price stability under certain technological conditions. Although currency competition creates problems for monetary policy, it is possible to design a policy rule that uniquely implements an efficient allocation. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.