Employment, hours and the welfare effects of intra-firm bargaining

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dossche, Maarten; Lewis, Vivien; Poilly, Celine
• 署名单位: European Central Bank; Deutsche Bundesbank; Aix-Marseille Universite; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Aix-Marseille Universite
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2018.09.002
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 67-84
• 关键词: employment; Hours; Intrafirm bargaining; Overhiring

摘要

Bilateral bargaining between a multiple-worker firm and individual employees leads to overhiring. With a concave production function, the firm can reduce the marginal product by hiring an additional worker, thereby reducing the bargaining wage paid to all existing employees. We show that this externality is amplified when firms can adjust hours per worker as well as employment. Firms keep down workers' wage demands by reducing the number of hours per worker and the resulting labor disutility. Our finding is particularly relevant for European economies where hours adjustment plays an important role. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.