Macroeconomic policy games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bodenstein, Martin; Guerrieri, Luca; LaBriola, Joe
• 署名单位: Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2018.07.015
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 64-81
• 关键词: Optimal policy; strategic interaction; welfare analysis; Monetary policy cooperation; Macroprudential regulation

摘要

We develop a toolbox that characterizes the welfare-maximizing cooperative Ramsey policies under full commitment and open-loop Nash games between policymakers. We adopt the timeless perspective. Two examples for the use of our toolbox offer novel results. The first example revisits the case of monetary policy coordination in a two-country model to highlight sensitivity to the choice of policy instruments. For the second example, a central bank and a macroprudential policymaker are assigned distinct objectives in a model with financial frictions. Lack of cooperation can lead to large welfare losses even if technology shocks are the only source of fluctuations. (C) 2018 Published by Elsevier B.V.