Financial frictions, investment, and Tobin's q

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cao, Dan; Lorenzoni, Guido; Walentin, Karl
• 署名单位: Georgetown University; Northwestern University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Sveriges Riksbank
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2018.08.002
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 105-122
• 关键词: Financial constraints; Optimal financial contracts; INVESTMENT; Tobin's Q; limited enforcement

摘要

A model of investment with financial constraints is used to study the relation between investment and Tobin's q. A firm is financed by both inside and outside investors. When insiders' wealth is scarce, the firm's value includes a quasi-rent on invested capital. Therefore, two forces drive q: the value of invested capital and future quasi-rents. Relative to a frictionless benchmark, this weakens the relationship between investment and q, generating more realistic correlations between investment, q, and cash flow. The quantitative implications of the model for investment regressions depend crucially on the nature of the shocks hitting the firm. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.