The power of sunspots: An experimental analysis

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fehr, Dietmar; Heinemann, Frank; Llorente-Saguer, Aniol
• 署名单位: Ruprecht Karls University Heidelberg; Technical University of Berlin; University of London; Queen Mary University London; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2018.08.006
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 123-136
• 关键词: Coordination games; strategic uncertainty; Sunspot equilibria; Forward guidance; expectations

摘要

In an experiment using a coordination game with extrinsic random signals (sunspots), we systematically vary the stochastic process generating these signals and measure how signals affect behavior. We find that sunspot equilibria emerge naturally with salient public signals. However, highly correlated private signals can also lead to sunspot-driven behavior, even when this is not an equilibrium. Private signals reduce the power of public signals as sunspot variables. The higher the correlation of extrinsic signals and the more easily they can be aggregated, the more powerful these signals are in distracting actions from the action that minimizes strategic uncertainty. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.