Public bank guarantees and allocative efficiency

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gropp, Reint; Guettler, Andre; Saadi, Vahid
• 署名单位: Leibniz Association; Leibniz Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH); Otto von Guericke University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Ulm University; IE University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2019.09.006
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 53-69
• 关键词: Banking; Bank guarantees; Allocative efficiency

摘要

A natural experiment and matched bank/firm data are used to identify the effects of bank guarantees on allocative efficiency. We find that with guarantees in place unproductive firms receive larger loans, invest more, and maintain higher rates of sales and wage growth. Moreover, firms produce less productively. Firms also survive longer in banks' portfolios and those that enter guaranteed banks' portfolios are less profitable and productive. Finally, we observe fewer economy-wide firm exits and bankruptcy filings in the presence of guarantees. Overall, the results are consistent with the idea that guaranteed banks keep unproductive firms in business for too long. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.