Anti-lobbying gains from international agreements

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Maggi, Giovanni
• 署名单位: Yale University; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2019.10.010
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 20-34
• 关键词: Lobbying; International agreements

摘要

I argue that an important potential benefit of international agreements is to reduce wasteful rent-seeking activities by domestic and foreign special interest groups, through a reduction in policy discretion. The presence of foreign lobbying generates a novel type of international externality: by inviting wasteful rent-seeking by foreign lobbies, the presence of policy discretion itself generates a negative international externality. I examine the potential anti-lobbying effects of three salient types of international rules: exact policy commitments, policy bounds and non-discrimination rules. Unlike exact policy commitments, which remove policy discretion and hence shut down ex-post lobbying, policy bounds may invite ex-post lobbying and hence may forego part or all of the potential anti lobbying gains. I also find that policy bounds may lead to mixed-strategy equilibria of the rent-seeking game. A non-discrimination rule can reduce rent-seeking by foreign lobbies, by injecting a free-rider problem in the strategic interaction between these lobbies, and under some conditions can achieve all the potential anti-foreign-lobbying gains. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.