Macroprudential policy with capital buffers *

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Schroth, Josef
• 署名单位: Bank of Canada
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2020.12.003
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 296-311
• 关键词: Financial intermediation; Macroprudential capital regulation; Dividend restrictions

摘要

Financial regulation imposes equity buffers on banks by restricting dividends. This paper studies constrained-efficient dividend policy when banks fund loans with equity and debt. In the model, bank shareholders consider equity costly and a bank's access to debt depends on its shareholder value. In response to loan losses banks cut dividends, but eventually defer dividends too much. They do not internalize that a commitment to higher dividends (and fewer loans) during recoveries from financial crises would increase shareholder value and access to debt during crises. Constrained-efficient dividends, while restricted during normal times and zero during crises, are higher during recoveries.