Government policies in a granular global economy

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gaubert, Cecile; Itskhoki, Oleg; Vogler, Maximilian
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Princeton University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2021.04.003
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 95-112
• 关键词: Granular comparative advantage; Industrial policy; Trade policy; ANTITRUST

摘要

Using a granular model of international trade, we study the rationale and implications of various government interventions targeted at large individual firms. In antitrust regulation, governments face an incentive to be overly lenient towards domestic mergers in comparative advantage sectors. In trade policy, targeting individual foreign exporters rather than entire sectors minimizes the pass-through of import tariffs into domestic consumer prices, shifting the burden towards foreign producers. In industrial policy, subsidizing 'national champions' is generally suboptimal in closed economies as it leads to an excessive buildup of market power, yet it may become unilaterally welfare improving in open economies at the cost of the foreign consumers. (c) 2021 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ )