Breaking the spell with credit-easing: Self-confirming credit crises in competitive search economies

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gaballo, Gaetano; Marimon, Ramon
• 署名单位: Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; European University Institute; Pompeu Fabra University; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2021.01.007
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 1-20
• 关键词: Unconventional policies; Asset-backed securities (ABS); Term asset-backed securities lending facility& nbsp; (TALF)

摘要

In self-confirming crises lenders charge high interest rates wrongly believing that lower rates would generate losses. In a directed-search economy, misperceptions can persist because there is no equilibrium evidence that can confute it, preventing constrained efficiency. A policy maker with the same beliefs as lenders will find it optimal to offer a contingent subsidy to induce lower market rates. As lenders price assets in response to this policy, new information may disprove misperceptions and restore efficiency. New micro-evidence suggests that the 2009 TALF intervention in the market of newly generated ABS was an example of the optimal policy in our model. (c) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.