Double overreaction in beauty contests with information acquisition: Theory and experiment *

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Baeriswyl, Romain; My, Kene Boun; Cornand, Camille
• 署名单位: Swiss National Bank (SNB); Universites de Strasbourg Etablissements Associes; Universite de Strasbourg; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite de Lorraine; INRAE; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); CNRS - Institute for Humanities & Social Sciences (INSHS); Ecole Normale Superieure de Lyon (ENS de LYON); Universite Claude Bernard Lyon 1; Universite Jean Monnet; Universite Lyon 2
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2020.12.004
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 432-445
• 关键词: Beauty contest; information acquisition; overreaction; Central bank communication

摘要

Central banks' disclosures, such as forward guidance, have a weaker effect on the economy in reality than that predicted in theoretical models. In a beauty contest with information acquisition, we show that strategic complementarities give rise to a double overreaction to public disclosures by increasing agents' equilibrium level of attention, which, in turn, increases the weight assigned to the disclosures in agents' equilibrium action. A laboratory experiment provides evidence that the effect of strategic complementarities on participants' realised level of attention and realised action is qualitatively consistent with the theoretical predictions. (c) 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.