Information management in times of crisis

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Anderson, Haelim; Copeland, Adam
• 署名单位: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC); Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - New York
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2023.01.008
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 35-49
• 关键词: Information management; Bank opacity; Banking crisis; Great Depression; Depositor confidence

摘要

How does information management and control affect bank stability? Following a national bank holiday in 1933, NY state bank regulators suspended the publication of balance sheets of state-charter banks for two years, whereas the national-charter bank regulator did not. This divergence in policies is used to examine how the suspension of bank-specific infor-mation affected depositors and the portfolio of assets held by banks. State-charter banks benefited, experiencing less deposit outflows than national-charter banks in 1933. Further, the behavior of bank deposits across both types of banks converged in 1934 after the in-troduction of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.(c) 2023 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.