Strategic referrals and on-the-job search equilibrium

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Moon, Ji-Woong
• 署名单位: Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2022.12.003
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 135-151
• 关键词: Referral; directed search; information design; On-the-job search

摘要

Referrals are prevalent in the U.S. labor market. To understand their aggregate effects, this paper studies an equilibrium model of on-the-job search and job referrals. In the model, referrals are modeled as a strategic interaction between a referrer and a firm. The equi-librium model shows that referrals benefit job searchers whose outside option is above a threshold. I support this prediction by showing that the referral wage premium exists only for employed job searchers. Quantitatively, referrals contribute to the total output by 3.93% through transmitting information and reducing search costs. The information transmission explains about 28% of the effects.(c) 2022 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.