Is a fiscal union optimal for a monetary union?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Berriel, Rafael; Gonzalez-Aguado, Eugenia; Kehoe, Patrick J.; Pastorino, Elena
• 署名单位: Stanford University; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research; Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Stanford University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2023.11.003
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 157-177
• 关键词: Fiscal delegation; Fiscal federalism; externalities; public goods; European Union enlargement

摘要

When is a fiscal union appropriate for a monetary union? In a monetary union without fiscal externalities, when local fiscal authorities have an informational advantage over a central fiscal authority in terms of their knowledge of countries' preferences for government spending, a decentralized fiscal regime dominates a centralized one. Our novel result is that in the presence of fiscal externalities across countries, however, a decentralized fiscal regime is optimal for small monetary unions, whereas a centralized fiscal regime is optimal for large ones. These results shed new light on the debate on fiscal integration within the EU and its enlargement.