Central bank digital currency: When price and bank stability collide

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Schilling, Linda; Fernandez-Villaverde, Jesus; Uhlig, Harald
• 署名单位: Washington University (WUSTL); Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); University of Pennsylvania; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Chicago; University of Pennsylvania; University of Chicago
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2024.01.007
• 发表日期: 2024
• 关键词: CBDC; currency crises; monetary policy; Bank runs; Spending runs; financial intermediation; Central bank digital currency; inflation targeting

摘要

This paper shows the existence of a central bank trilemma. When a central bank is involved in financial intermediation, either directly through a central bank digital currency (CBDC) or indirectly through other policy instruments, it can only achieve two of three objectives: a socially efficient allocation, financial stability (i.e., absence of runs), and price stability. In particular, a commitment to price stability can cause a run on the central bank. Implementation of the socially optimal allocation requires a commitment to inflation. We illustrate this idea through a nominal version of the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model. Our perspective may be particularly appropriate when CBDCs are introduced on a wide scale.