Sovereign risk and Dutch disease☆

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Esquivel, Carlos
• 署名单位: Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2024.103663
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: Sovereign default; Dutch disease; Investment inefficiencies

摘要

I study how, in the presence of default risk, the Dutch disease amplifies an inefficiency in the sectoral allocation of capital. In a sovereign default model with commodities and production of traded and non-traded goods, default incentives increase when more capital is allocated to non-traded production. Households do not internalize this, giving rise to an inefficiently large non-traded sector. Commodity windfalls amplify this inefficiency through the classic Dutch disease mechanism. I characterize state-contingent subsidies that implement the efficient allocation and compare them to a simpler subsidy rule that ameliorates the externality. Evidence from spreads, natural-resource rents, and sectoral investment data support the main findings of the model.