Optimal unemployment insurance with multiple applications

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Wee, Shu Lin
• 署名单位: University of Melbourne
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-3932
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2025.103798
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: Multiple applications; Optimal cyclicality; unemployment insurance

摘要

This paper examines how unemployment transfers should be allocated over the business cycle. When risk-averse workers can submit multiple applications, the optimal UI policy is countercyclical. In contrast, optimal policy in a standard search model featuring one-to-one matching is procyclical. In the latter, more generous UI during a downturn discourages search effort, dampening job creation. In the former, decreased search effort aids job creation. Because firms cannot coordinate and commit to not making the same worker an offer, lower search effort by reducing the number of applications sent mitigates this coordination friction. This in turn boosts job creation incentives, supporting employment outcomes.