SOCIAL NORMS AND WELFARE STATE DYNAMICS
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Lindbeck, Assar; Nyberg, Sten; Weibull, Joergen W.
署名单位：
Stockholm University; Stockholm University; Boston University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
ISSN/ISSBN：
1542-4766
DOI：
10.1162/154247603322391170
发表日期：
2003
页码：
533-542
关键词：
摘要：
The paper analyses the interaction between economic incentives and work norms in the context of social insurance. If the work norm is endogenous in the sense that it is weaker when the population share of beneficiaries is higher, then voters will choose less generous benefits than otherwise. We also discuss welfare-state dynamics when there is a time lag in the adjustment of the norm in response to changes in this population share, and show how a temporary shift in the unemployment rate may cause persistence in the number of beneficiaries. (JEL: Z13, D19, D64, H31)
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