DYNAMIC POLITICAL CHOICE IN MACROECONOMICS
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Hassler, John; Storesletten, Kjetil; Zilibotti, Fabrizio
署名单位：
Stockholm University; Stockholm University; Stockholm University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
ISSN/ISSBN：
1542-4766
DOI：
10.1162/154247603322391189
发表日期：
2003
页码：
543-552
关键词：
摘要：
We analyze positive theories of redistribution, social insurance and public good provision in a dynamic macroeconomic framework. Political outcomes are determined via repeated voting and driven by a conflict of interests between agents. Voters and politicians rationally forecast the impact of current political choices on future political and economic outcomes. The theory is consistent with large differences in the size of governments across societies. These need not rely on intrinsic differences in preferences or technology, but may be driven by self-fulfilling expectations about the robustness of the welfare state. (JEL: D72, E62, H11, H31, P16)
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