PYRAMIDS
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Bertrand, Marianne; Mullainathan, Sendhil
署名单位：
University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
ISSN/ISSBN：
1542-4766
DOI：
10.1162/154247603322391116
发表日期：
2003
页码：
478-483
关键词：
摘要：
Most corporate finance models of firm behavior study the typical U.S. corporation: one firm with a large set of dispersed shareholders. In contrast, in many countries around the world, firms are often held in groups with complicated ownership structures. These groups, often referred to as pyramids, raise very distinct questions about firm behavior; these questions that are especially relevant for developing countries where these groups are most prevalent. In this paper, we first describe some empirical research we have performed on the nature of agency problems within pyramids. We then discuss a variety of questions, both theoretical and empirical, that remain to be unexplored. (JEL: J3)
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