AUCTIONING MANY DIVISIBLE GOODS
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Ausubel, Lawrence M.; Cramton, Peter
署名单位：
University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
ISSN/ISSBN：
1542-4766
DOI：
10.1162/154247604323068168
发表日期：
2004
页码：
480-493
关键词：
摘要：
We study the theory and practical implementation of auctioning many divisible goods. With multiple related goods, price discovery is important not only to reduce the winner's curse, but more importantly, to simplify the bidder's decision problem and to facilitate the revelation of preferences in the bids. Simultaneous clock auctions are especially desirable formats for auctioning many divisible goods. We examine the properties of these auctions and discuss important practical considerations in applying them. (JEL: D44)
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