THE CHOICE OF EXCHANGE-RATE REGIME AND SPECULATIVE ATTACKS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cukierman, Alex; Goldstein, Itay; Spiegel, Yossi
• 署名单位: Tel Aviv University; Tilburg University; University of Pennsylvania
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1542-4766
• DOI: 10.1162/1542476042813869
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 1206-1241
• 关键词: monetary-policy; target zones; unique equilibrium; rate bands; MODEL; credibility

摘要

We develop a framework that makes it possible to study, for the first time, the strategic interaction between the ex ante choice of exchange-rate regime and the likelihood of ex post currency attacks. The optimal regime is determined by a policymaker who trades off the loss from nominal exchange-rate uncertainty against the cost of adopting a given regime. This cost increases, in turn, with the fraction of speculators who attack the local currency. Searching for the optimal regime within the class of exchange-rate bands, we show that the optimal regime can be either a peg (a zero-width band), a free float (an infinite-width band), or a nondegenerate band of finite width. We study the effect of several factors on the optimal regime and on the probability of currency attacks. In particular, we show that a Tobin tax induces policymakers to set less flexible regimes. In our model, this generates an increase in the probability of currency attacks. (JEL: F31, D84)