Wasteful public spending and state aid control

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Dewatripont, Mathias; Seabright, Paul
• 署名单位: Universite Libre de Bruxelles
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1542-4766
• DOI: 10.1162/jeea.2006.4.2-3.513
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 513-522
• 关键词: market

摘要

The conventional academic rationale for supranational intervention to curb state aids to industry appeals to transfrontier spillovers. However, competition policy practitioners often speak in terms of curbing wasteful spending, regardless of whether or not any international spillovers are involved. Although it is often argued that such wasteful spending calls not for supranational state aid control but rather for better domestic political accountability, this paper argues that wasteful spending may be a by-product of accountability, not a symptom of its absence. Specifically, we describe a model in which politicians fund projects that are wasteful as a way to signal their diligence, and voters rationally reward them for this. We discuss implications for the role of state aid control mechanisms.