The timing of education
成果类型：
Article; Proceedings Paper
署名作者：
Gall, Thomas; Legros, Patrick; Newman, Andrew
署名单位：
University of Bonn; Universite Libre de Bruxelles; Boston University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
ISSN/ISSBN：
1542-4766
DOI：
10.1162/jeea.2006.4.2-3.427
发表日期：
2006
页码：
427-435
关键词：
摘要：
We study an assignment-with-investment model to highlight a tradeoff between investment in human capital before (ex ante system) and after (ex post system) matching on the labor market. The ex post system is better at coordinating investment within firms whereas the ex ante system is better at reducing mismatches. We further show that the ability to transfer surplus within firms affects mismatches and the relative performance of the two systems. At high degrees of transferability, they are equivalent. But when transferability is very low, the ex post system outperforms the ex ante system, although with moderate transferability the reverse is true.
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