Sorting with motivated agents: Implications for school competition and teacher incentives
成果类型：
Article; Proceedings Paper
署名作者：
Besley, Timothy; Ghatak, Maitreesh
署名单位：
University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
ISSN/ISSBN：
1542-4766
DOI：
10.1162/jeea.2006.4.2-3.404
发表日期：
2006
页码：
404-414
关键词：
摘要：
This paper proposes a simple framework to study incentives and matching in the market for teachers. The framework is used to investigate the consequences of introducing incentive pay for teachers when contracts have both a matching and an incentive effect. Our analysis suggests that school competition and teacher incentives cannot be studied in isolation from one another.
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