The political economy of fiscal policy
成果类型：
Article; Proceedings Paper
署名作者：
Battaglini, Marco; Coate, Stephen
署名单位：
Princeton University; Cornell University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
ISSN/ISSBN：
1542-4766
DOI：
10.1162/JEEA.2008.6.2-3.367
发表日期：
2008
页码：
367-380
关键词：
摘要：
We describe a theory of the collective choice of fiscal policy in dynamic economies that are subject to aggregate shocks. The theory incorporates realistically complex policy spaces, rational forward-looking agents, and a rich political decision process. We argue that it provides a tractable framework to study a variety of important questions in macroeconomics and public finance.
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