A NEW PAYMENT RULE FOR CORE-SELECTING PACKAGE AUCTIONS
成果类型：
Article; Proceedings Paper
署名作者：
Erdil, Aytek; Klemperer, Paul
署名单位：
University of Oxford
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
ISSN/ISSBN：
1542-4766
DOI：
10.1111/j.1542-4774.2010.tb00524.x
发表日期：
2010
页码：
537-547
关键词：
摘要：
We propose a new, easy-to-implement class of payment rules, Reference Rules to make core-selecting package auctions more robust. Small, almost-riskless, profitable deviations from truthful bidding are often easy for bidders to find under currently used payment rules. Reference Rules perform better than existing rules on our marginal-incentive-to-deviate criterion, and are as robust as existing rules to large deviations. Other considerations, including fairness and comprehensibility, also support the use of Reference Rules. (JEL: D44, C71)
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