ASSET AUCTIONS, INFORMATION, AND LIQUIDITY

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Vives, Xavier
• 署名单位: University of Navarra; Pompeu Fabra University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1542-4766
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1542-4774.2010.tb00517.x
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 467-477
• 关键词: uniform-price auctions

摘要

A model is presented of a uniform price auction where bidders compete in demand schedules; the model allows for common and private values in the absence of exogenous noise. It is shown how private information yields more market power than the levels seen with full information. Results obtained here are broadly consistent with evidence from asset auctions, may help explain the response of central banks to the crisis, and suggest potential improvements in the auction formats of asset auctions. (JEL: D44, D82, G14, E58)