BUYER POWER AND INTRABRAND COORDINATION

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Miklos-Thal, Jeanine; Rey, Patrick; Verge, Thibaud
• 署名单位: University of Rochester; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1542-4766
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1542-4774.2011.01019.x
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 721-741
• 关键词: resale price maintenance; slotting allowances; exclusion; CONTRACTS; bertrand; fees

摘要

We analyze the competitive effects of various contractual provisions in a situation where rival retailers make offers to a common manufacturer. In contrast to Marx and Shaffer (2007, Rand Journal of Economics, 38(3), 823-843), who find that a strong retailer can use slotting allowances (that is, upfront payments from manufacturers) to exclude its weaker rival, we show that foreclosure is no longer inevitable once retailers' offers can be contingent on the relationship being exclusive or not. There then exist equilibria that sustain the industry monopoly outcome; moreover, as long as retailers can use non-linear tariffs, such equilibria exist irrespectively of whether slotting allowances are allowed or banned. Non-contingent contracts, on the other hand, necessarily lead to exclusion, with or without slotting allowances. A ban on slotting allowances may therefore prove ineffective, while a ban on exclusive dealing options in supply contracts leads to foreclosure.