A MODEL OF ETHNIC CONFLICT

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Esteban, Joan; Ray, Debraj
• 署名单位: Barcelona School of Economics; Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); New York University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1542-4766
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1542-4774.2010.01016.x
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 496-521
• 关键词: costly conflict; INEQUALITY; POWER

摘要

We present a model of conflict in which discriminatory government policy or social intolerance is responsive to various forms of ethnic activism, including violence. It is this perceived responsiveness-captured by the probability that the government gives in and accepts a proposed change in ethnic policy-that induces individuals to mobilize, often violently, to support their cause. Yet, mobilization is costly and militants have to be compensated accordingly. The model allows for both financial and human contributions to conflict and allows for a variety of individual attitudes (radicalism) towards the cause. The main results concern the effects of within-group heterogeneity in radicalism and income, as well as the correlation between radicalism and income, in precipitating conflict.