NORM ENFORCEMENT: ANGER, INDIGNATION, OR RECIPROCITY?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Carpenter, Jeffrey P.; Matthews, Peter Hans
• 署名单位: Middlebury College
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1542-4766
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1542-4774.2011.01059.x
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 555-572
• 关键词: public-goods; PUNISHMENT; COOPERATION; provision

摘要

The enforcement of social norms often requires that unaffected third parties sanction offenders. Given the renewed interest of economists in norms, the literature on third-party punishment is surprisingly thin. In this paper, we report the results of an experiment designed to replicate the anger-based punishment of directly affected second parties and evaluate two distinct explanations for third-party punishment: indignation and group reciprocity. We find evidence in favor of both, with the caveat that the incidence of indignation-driven sanctions is perhaps smaller than earlier studies have hinted. Furthermore, our results suggest that second parties use sanctions to promote conformism while third parties intervene primarily to promote efficiency.