LYING ABOUT WHAT YOU KNOW OR ABOUT WHAT YOU DO?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Serra-Garcia, Marta; van Damme, Eric; Potters, Jan
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California San Diego; Tilburg University; Tilburg University; Tilburg University; Tilburg University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1542-4766
• DOI: 10.1111/jeea.12034
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 1204-1229
• 关键词: cheap-talk; promises; games; COMMUNICATION; COORDINATION; leadership; example; words; truth; lies

摘要

Abstract We compare communication about private information to communication about actions in a one-shot 2-person public good game with private information. The informed player, who knows the exact return from contributing and whose contribution is unobserved, can send a message about the return or her contribution. Theoretically, messages can elicit the uninformed player's contribution, and allow the informed player to free-ride. The exact language used is not expected to matter. Experimentally, however, we find that free-ride depends on the language: the informed player free-rides less-and thereby lies less frequently-when she talks about her contribution than when she talks about the return. Further experimental evidence indicates that it is the promise component in messages about the contribution that leads to less free-ride and less lying.