DISCRIMINATION AND EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Holden, Steinar; Rosen, Asa
• 署名单位: University of Oslo
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1542-4766
• DOI: 10.1111/jeea.12097
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 1676-1699
• 关键词: racial-discrimination; labor-markets; unemployment; policies

摘要

We study a search model with employment protection legislation. We show that if the output from the match is uncertain at the hiring stage, a discriminatory equilibrium may exist in which workers with the same productive characteristics are subject to different hiring standards. If a bad match takes place, discriminated workers will take longer to find another job, prolonging the costly period for the firm. This makes it less profitable for firms to hire discriminated workers, thus sustaining the discrimination. In contrast to Becker's model, the existence of employers with a taste for discrimination may make it more profitable to discriminate, even for firms without discriminatory preferences.