SALES AND COLLUSION IN A MARKET WITH STORAGE

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Nava, Francesco; Schiraldi, Pasquale
• 署名单位: University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1542-4766
• DOI: 10.1111/jeea.12046
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 791-832
• 关键词: equilibrium price dispersion; consumer; MODEL; BEHAVIOR; search; IMPACT

摘要

Sales are a widespread and well-known phenomenon documented in several product markets. This paper presents a novel rationale for sales that does not rely on consumer heterogeneity, or on any form of randomness to explain such periodic price fluctuations. The analysis is carried out in the context of a simple repeated price competition model, and establishes that firms must periodically reduce prices in order to sustain collusion when goods are storable and the market is large. The largest equilibrium profits are characterized at any market size. A trade-off between the size of the industry and its profits arises. Sales foster collusion, by magnifying the inter-temporal links in consumers' decisions.