EXPLAINING GIFT-EXCHANGE-THE LIMITS OF GOOD INTENTIONS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Netzer, Nick; Schmutzler, Armin
• 署名单位: University of Zurich
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1542-4766
• DOI: 10.1111/jeea.12086
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 1586-1616
• 关键词: social preferences; moral hazard; hidden costs; RECIPROCITY; fairness; field; CONTRACTS; incentives; equity; MARKET

摘要

This paper explores the limitations of intention-based social preferences as an explanation of gift-exchange between a firm and a worker. In a framework with one self-interested and one reciprocal player, gift-giving never arises in equilibrium. Instead, any equilibrium in a large class of multistage games must involve mutually unkind behavior of both players. Besides gift-exchange, this class of games also includes moral hazard models and the rotten kid framework. Even though equilibrium behavior may appear positively reciprocal in some of these games, the self-interested player never benefits from reciprocity. We discuss the relation of these results to the theoretical and empirical literature on gift-exchange in employment relations.