POLITICAL SELECTION IN CHINA: THE COMPLEMENTARY ROLES OF CONNECTIONS AND PERFORMANCE

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jia, Ruixue; Kudamatsu, Masayuki; Seim, David
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California San Diego; Stockholm University; University of Toronto; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1542-4766
• DOI: 10.1111/jeea.12124
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 631-668
• 关键词: information; turnover; GROWTH

摘要

Who becomes a top politician in China? We focus on provincial leadersa pool of candidates for top political officeand examine how their chances of promotion depend on their performance in office and connections with top politicians. Our empirical analysis, based on the curriculum vitae of Chinese politicians, shows that connections and performance are complements in the Chinese political selection process. This complementarity is stronger the younger provincial leaders are relative to their connected top leaders. To provide one plausible interpretation of these empirical findings, we propose a simple theory in which the complementarity arises because connections foster loyalty of junior officials to senior ones, thereby allowing incumbent top politicians to select competent provincial leaders without risking being ousted. Our findings shed some light on why a political system known for patronage can still select competent leaders.