LABOR SUPPLY OF POLITICIANS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fisman, Raymond; Harmon, Nikolaj A.; Kamenica, Emir; Munk, Inger
• 署名单位: Boston University; University of Copenhagen; University of Chicago
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1542-4766
• DOI: 10.1111/jeea.12141
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 871-905
• 关键词: decisions; ambition

摘要

Using data on Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), we examine the impact of salaries on the composition and the behavior of legislators. Employing a differences-in-differences approach, we exploit the introduction of a law that equalized MEPs' salaries which had previously differed by as much as a factor of 10. Increasing salaries raises the fraction of MEPs who run for re-election but decreases the quality of elected MEPs (proxied by college quality). Salary has no discernible impact on effort or legislation output. Higher salaries induce more political competition.