A MECHANISM DESIGN APPROACH TO CLIMATE-CHANGE AGREEMENTS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Martimort, David; Sand-Zantman, Wilfried
• 署名单位: Paris School of Economics; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; ESSEC Business School
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1542-4766
• DOI: 10.1111/jeea.12150
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 669-718
• 关键词: imperfect information; uncertainty; cost; allocation; EFFICIENCY; CONTRACTS; game

摘要

We take a mechanism design perspective to investigate how environmental agreements should account for multilateral externalities, incentive compatibility, and voluntary participation by sovereign countries. The optimal mechanism involves a tradeoff between a free rider problem in the effort provision of participating countries and the necessity of inducing countries to ratify the agreement. This mechanism can be approximated by a simple menuwith attractive implementation and robustness properties. Limits on enforcement and commitment might nevertheless hinder the performance of this menu, making the business as usual scenario more likely.