LET'S TALK: HOW COMMUNICATION AFFECTS CONTRACT DESIGN

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Brandts, Jordi; Ellman, Matthew; Charness, Gary
• 署名单位: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); Barcelona School of Economics; University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1542-4766
• DOI: 10.1111/jeea.12157
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 943-974
• 关键词: reference points; promises; fairness

摘要

We study experimentally how communication changes the effectiveness of contract types when sellers choose unenforceable quality after a possible cost shock. Communication potentially removes conflicting perceptions that may otherwise plague flexible contracts. Indeed, we find that introducing free-form communication sharply reverses an advantage of rigid contracts in favor of flexible contracts, which then deliver much higher earnings. Control treatments that avoid selection effects reveal a strong parallel shift from rigid to flexible. Chat content analysis identifies clarification of post-shock transfers, promises, and personal rapport as key correlates of high earnings, with clarification working only in conjunction with flexible contracts. A communication channel restricted to clarifying transfer plans also favors use of flexible contracts, but mildly compared to chat. (JEL: C91, D03, D86)